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Article
Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies:
Lessons from China
XUAN-THAO NGUYEN
It is afrequent refrain that "the world is shrinking." In this same vein,
the global influence of China is clearly rising. Chinese businesses are
becoming more prominent in the global market, and as such, the influence
and effect of Chinese law is likewise gaining in import. Chinese
intellectual property law is no different.
One notable aspect of Chinese intellectual property law is the
availability of apology as a remedy. Despite a culture that places a high
value on apology, and considerable legal scholarship and precedent
regarding apology as remedy, many in the United States scoff at the notion
of introducing apology as a remedy in U.S. intellectual property law.
There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of injunctions and damages
(currently the predominant remedies in US. intellectual property law), and
tangible benefits to apology. This Article uses Chinese intellectual
property law as an example and addresses the limits of the current U.S.
intellectual property regime, as well as the potential benefits of a change.
The Article concludes that it is time for the United States to learn from
beyond its boundaries in order to provide just recourse in intellectual
property disputes.
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Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies:
Lessons from China
XuAN-THAo NGUYEN*
1. INTRODUCTION
American culture values apology. Parents instill in youngsters the
importance of apology and the need to apologize in a timely and sincere
manner when an offense is committed. Americans routinely apologize for
their own misconduct. Apologies are heard, and read about, daily. In
recent years, athletes with a visible brand-image, corporate officers of
global companies, and politicians with national statures have publicly
apologized for their misconduct. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that
apology is almost as familiar to Americans as apple pie. Yet whenever I
inform my students, colleagues, lawyers, and other Americans about
China's embrace of apology as a remedy in litigation, the responses are
strikingly dismissive and consistent: apology is "culturally Chinese," and
making an apology is "what Chinese people do."
This Article assesses apology as a remedy in intellectual property law.
The Article observes a growing recognition of the roles apologies play in
law. Legal scholars began the process with influential legal scholarship on
apology in 1986, initiating a wealth of scholarship development in the
field.1 John Haley's Implications of Apology implored legal scholars to
realize the importance of looking beyond our boundaries to learn what
others have done or are doing, in an effort to reach our own goals of
justice.2 Haley then suggested that the field has much to learn from Japan
. Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Former IP Associate, Fried Frank Harris
Shriver & Jacobson (NYC) and Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn (NYC). A version of this Article
was presented at the Boston University School of Law Intellectual Property Colloquium in January
2011 and the University of Hawaii Richardson School of Law in March 2010. Many thanks to all of
my friends and colleagues in the United States and China for their contributions to this Article. Thanks
to Shruti Krishnan and Chris Gabriel, Class of 2010, and Pei-Chih "Peggy" Ho and Elizabeth Polk,
Class of 2011 for providing valuable research assistance. Special thanks to Erik Darwin Hille and
Khai-Leif Nguyen-Hille for their love, patience, and support. This Article was funded in part by the
Peter S. Chantillis, Esq., Class of 1957, Memorial Faculty Research Fund.
' See, e.g., Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 461,461 (1986) (discussing the role of apology
in the formal resolution of legal disputes in America and Japan); see also infra Section III.A.
2 See John 0. Haley, Comment, The Implications ofApology, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 499, 504-05
(1986) (discussing the role of apology in both Japan and the United States).
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
about the role of apologies in law.3 This Article looks beyond our
boundaries and suggests that there is much to learn from China about
apologies in intellectual property law.
In the past five years, both quantitative and qualitative data indicate
that the New China4 has accelerated its acceptance of intellectual property
rights as valuable assets.5 Chinese businesses rely on trademarks as
indispensable reputational sources for their goods and services, and they
protect their rights by utilizing the legal system to fight against infringing
conduct committed by other Chinese businesses.6 In addition to trademark
infringement cases, Chinese businesses bring infringement suits to protect
their corporate intangible assets relating to copyrights and patents.7
Yearly, tens of thousands of suits relating to intellectual property rights are
filed by Chinese businesses against other businesses in China.8
Statistically, in the last few years, there have been more intellectual
property litigation cases filed annually in China than in the United States.9
Among the remedies sought by Chinese intellectual property owners are
apologies from the wrongdoers.' ° Both injunctions and damages are
available and routinely obtained by the prevailing Chinese intellectual
property owners.'" In addition to these remedies, the prevailing owners
frequently avail themselves of the statutorily available apology remedy as
well.
What roles do apologies have in law, specifically intellectual property
law? What can one learn from China with respect to remedies in
intellectual property law? In the age of globalization America cannot
afford to dismiss the New China: what happens in China matters in the
United States. There is much to learn beyond our borders, and the United
States cannot ignore apologies as remedies in Chinese intellectual property
law by simplistically labeling apologies as inherently Chinese cultural
behavior. It is time to reflect on whether apologies as remedies should be
3 1d. at 504.
4 "New China" is used in this Article to refer to China as a nation undergoing a recent and
significant rise in global power and importance. See also David E. Sanger, Three Faces of the New
China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,2010, at WK1.
5 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China's Intellectual
Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 774-76 (2011).
6 Intellectual Property Rights: Trademark, U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, CHINA,
http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/iprtrade.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
7See J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent
Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 Nw. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 449, 450 (2007) ("[B]oth
patent invalidation and patent litigation will become an important part of the business strategies for
multinational companies operating in China.").
8 Id. at 449 n.l.
9 Nguyen, supra note 5, at 775.
1o See infra Part V.
Id.
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considered in the United States. At the very least, Americans should be
aware of what roles apologies play in Chinese intellectual property law as
U.S. companies may find themselves ordered to apologize to Chinese
companies in intellectual property disputes in China.
Part II of this Article observes apology as normative behavior in
American culture. Contrary to the view of apology as inherently Chinese,
Part II establishes that American culture fully embraces apology, from the
school playground to the hallowed halls of Congress, from Wall Street to
the courtroom, and from private settings to public YouTube clips.
Legal scholars, legislators, and judges all recognize the importance of
apologies in law. Part III traces the history of the development of apology
scholarship, with a rich beginning marked by a collection of articles
published in Law & Society Review in 1986 on the implications of apology
in Japan and in the United States. The robust body of legal scholarship on
apology demonstrates that apology as a legal remedy is an accepted norm.
Significantly, apologies have moved beyond the theoretical stratosphere,
and into statutes and case law as jurisdictions across the United States have
come to recognize the benefits of apologies. States have enacted statutes
codifying acceptance of apologetic gestures and protecting those gestures
from being considered as evidence against the apologizing person. Part III
also identifies and discusses how courts have treated apologies as remedies
in a range of different types of cases.
With respect to remedies available under U.S. intellectual property
law, Part IV assesses the current state of injunctive relief and damages.
Though strong property rights have long been touted as the hallmark of
U.S. intellectual property law, injunctive relief sought by intellectual
property owners is no longer automatically available once the owners
prevail in an infringement suit. Recent landmark Supreme Court decisions,
and subsequent adherence to these precedents by lower courts, have
substantially weakened the strong property rights embedded in the power
of injunctive relief. Damages are also difficult to obtain by prevailing
owners in intellectual property suits due to the difficulty of proving losses
caused by specific infringing conduct. The current state of injunctive relief
and damages in intellectual property law should serve as a catalyst to look
beyond American borders in order to learn what other nations are doing
with respect to remedies, specifically apologies as remedies in intellectual
property law.
Part V focuses on the roles of apologies in China's intellectual
property law. An examination of China's anti-competition, trademark, and
copyright statutes reveals the various remedies available-including
injunction, damages, and apologies. Contextualizing the roles of
apologies, Part V studies legal opinions issued by Chinese courts. The
circumstances in a case, the extent of the infringing conduct, and the harm
incurred by the intellectual property owner all dictate whether apologies
2012]
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are warranted in addition to injunctive relief and damages.
After looking in a broader perspective at China's intellectual property
law, and its remedies, Part VI suggests that the United States should
likewise be more open to apologies as remedies in certain types of
intellectual property infringement cases-particularly those involving
reputational harms caused by trademark and copyright infringements. Part
VI argues that there is already some support in U.S. intellectual property
case law, as seen through reported decisions wherein the parties settled
their disputes with apologies and the court was not hostile to apologetic
remedies.
Reflecting on the role of apologies in American daily life, and in the
legal system, and looking outwardly to China with its inclusion of
apologetic justice, the Article concludes that apologies may serve as
additional remedies in intellectual property law in the United States.
II. AMERICAN CULTURE AND APOLOGIES
American culture fully embraces apology as a practice of remorse and
repentance offered by wrongdoers, and as a conciliatory step to assist the
victimized recipients of apologies in their healing. On any given day in
American culture the phrase "I'm sorry" is common. Parents teach their
children at a young age to say the ubiquitous phrase when they take away
toys from a friend without permission, hit a playmate, or hurt a friend's
feelings. Preschool and elementary school teachers ingrain in the
youngsters the social norms of apology whenever they commit an offense
in the classroom or on the playground. Beyond familial and school
settings, adults use "I'm sorry" in personal apologies, to make amends in
our daily lives, and to improve interactions and relationships with people in
social circles and in the workplace.
Likewise, Americans are no strangers to hearing public apologies.
Politicians often offer public apologies when their conduct destroys the
public trust. Eliot Spitzer, the former governor of New York, held a press
conference apologizing to his family and the people of New York for his
links to a prostitution ring. 12  Mark Sanford, the governor of South
Carolina, made a public apology to his family and supporters, 13 and later
apologized to his cabinet, after he mysteriously disappeared from South
Carolina to Argentina for extramarital purposes while using state
resources. 14
1
2 N.Y. Governor Apologizes After Prostitution Link, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23561606/ #.Tp2M1euhCsl.
13 South Carolina Gov. Sanford Admits Extramarital Affair, CNNPOLITICS.COM (June 24, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/24/south.carolina.governor/index.html.
14 Jim Rutenberg & Shaila Dewan, Back at Work, Governor Puts Apology on Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2009, at A12.
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Major political figures and heads of nations have also made public
apologies on behalf of their constituents for the grave injustices inflicted
on other ethnic groups.' 5 Tony Blair, then Prime Minister of Great Britain,
apologized to Ireland for the Potato Famine which killed more than a
million Irish people. 16 The Japanese government issued a formal apology
for its use of other Asian women as "comfort women," or sex slaves,
during World War 11.17 The U.S. Congress, after a long tortuous history of
slavery, apologized to African-Americans for 246 years of institutional
slavery and the subsequent Jim Crow laws that systematically
discriminated against African-Americans in every facet of their lives.' 8
Americans need only turn on the television or look at YouTube to
watch apologies from public figures like international golf superstar Tiger
Woods. In a somber voice, Woods spoke about the pain his extramarital
affairs brought upon his family, friends, and fans. 9 World religious
figures, such as Pope Benedict, have issued letters of apology as well.
After the global scandal of sexual abuse committed by predatory Catholic
priests exploded, Pope Benedict apologized in an eight-page pastoral letter
to Irish Catholics for the "sinful and criminal" sexual abuse of thousands of
children across a span of decades.2° Similarly, corporate officers offer
public apologies. The 2008 financial collapse mined the world economy
and shattered many people's lives. Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive of
Goldman Sachs, offered an apology for his firm's activities leading to the
financial crisis.2'
Because of the omnipresence of apology in U.S. society, Americans
can immediately detect whether an apology is genuine. For example, one
of the worst environmental catastrophes in United States history occurred
on April 20, 2010-the BP oil spill. Months later, and only after the
corporate image of BP had been significantly tarnished, Tony Hayward,
chief executive officer of BP, apologized for the Gulf Coast oil spill
15 For a list of political apologies for major figures, see Graham G. Dodds, Political Apologies:
Chronological List, UPENN.EDU (Jan. 23, 2003), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/politicalapologies.html.
16 Kathy Marks, Blair Issues Apology for Irish Potato Famine, INDEPENDENT, June 2, 1997, at 2.
17 The Comfort Women Issue, EMBASSY OF JAPAN IN THE U.S., http://www.us.emb-
japan.go.jp/english/html/cwl.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
18 Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR (July 30, 2008), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=93059465; see also Krissah Thompson, Senate Backs Apology for
Slavery; Resolution Specifies That It Cannot Be Used in Reparations Cases, WASH. POST, June 19,
2009, at A5.
19 Paul Vitello, IApologize. No, Really, I'm Serious, I.... N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at WK2.
20 Editorial, The Pope and the Pedophilia Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A30; Rachel
Donadio, Pope Offers Apology, but No Punishment, for Clergy's Abuse in Ireland, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2010, at A6.
21 Christine Harper & Matt Townsend, Blankfein Apologizes for Goldman Sachs Role in Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid-newsarchive
&sid=aeV9jwqKKrEw ("We participated in things that were clearly wrong and have reason to
regret .... We apologize.").
2012]
disaster.22 Hayward's "I am sorry" and "I am very sorry" hit the airwaves
and the print media in major daily newspapers, including the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and the Washington Post on
June 3, 2010.23 Perhaps the beleaguered BP executives understood that
because previous efforts failed to address the mounting anger of
Americans, a public apology was worthwhile. But the apology was too
24late and woefully insincere.
It is commonly understood that certain circumstances warrant court-
ordered apologies. For example, a Colorado judge ordered the driver
responsible for a car crash that killed a University of Colorado track star to
take out a full-page apology in the campus newspaper.25 The entire
campus was mourning; the public apology made by the driver served to
acknowledge the loss felt by the community and helped ease the
community's pain. By making the apology public, the driver felt the
desired humiliation, while acknowledging the harm he had inflicted on the
victim and the public. Likewise, a court in Tuscaloosa, Alabama ordered a
District Attorney to write an apology letter for his conduct in a 1998
political race: the district attorney illegally used his opponent's criminal
background information in the race. 6 Another judge ordered a police
officer to apologize to a defense attorney after removing paperwork from
her file during a criminal sentencing hearing.27 When two teens repeatedly
pulled pranks yelling "Fire in the hole!" while hurling a thirty-two ounce
cup of soda and ice at a fast food restaurant worker and then fleeing, the
court ordered the teens to post an apology video on YouTube.28
Given the prevalent use of apologies in the United States, many
22 CNN Wire Staff, BP Apology Campaign Begins Airing, CNN.COM (June 3, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/02/oil.spill.bp.apology/index.html.
23 Id. ("The Gulf spill is a tragedy that never should have happened .... BP has taken full
responsibility for cleaning up the spill in the Gulf.... We've helped organize the largest environmental
response in this country's history. More than 2 million feet of boom, 30 planes and over 1,300 boats
are working to protect the shoreline. Where oil reaches the shore, thousands of people are ready to
clean it up. We will honor all legitimate claims. And our cleanup efforts will not come at any cost to
taxpayers. To those affected and your families, I am deeply sorry. The Gulf is home for thousands of
BP's employees and we all feel the impact. To all the volunteers and for the strong support of the
government, thank you. We know it is our responsibility to keep you informed. And do everything we
can so this never happens again. We will get this done. We will make this right.").24 1d. (reporting that despite the apology campaign to polish BP's tarnished image, "marketing
experts aren't so sure anything will help just yet-not with thousands of gallons of oil still gushing out
of the ruptured BP well").
25 John C. Ensslin, Judge Orders Apology Ad in Vehicular Homicide, GAZETrE.COM (Feb. 19,
2010), http://www.gazette.com/articles/judge-94456-apology-colorado.html.
26 Kevin Bowen, Smith Must Write Letter of Apology, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
2 7 jj Hensley, Officer Told To Apologize for Taking Lawyer's Notes, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov.
19, 2009, at BI.
28 Keyonna Summers, Judge Orders Teens to Post Apology on YouTube, USA TODAY (June 8,
2008), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2008-06-08-youtubeN.htm. The apology
video also included images of the teens face down being handcuffed on the hood of a car. Id.
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commentators have long asserted that "public apologies are ubiquitous in
American culture" and a "fully protected apology is both good business
and consistent with U.S. cultural values. 29 Indeed, numerous empirical
studies have examined the role of apologies. One found that ninety-eight
percent of civil medical malpractice claimants desire apologies.30
III. APOLOGIES AS REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Apology Legal Scholarship
In the last two decades, apology legal scholarship has become
increasingly robust. Legal scholars have focused on the implications of
apologies, such as whether an apology is an appropriate remedy in criminal
and civil suits, 3' whether an apology can right historic wrongs, 32 and
whether in specific types of cases a sincere apology 33 should be included.
34
29 See Michael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the Full
Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 160 (2009) ("Growing evidence suggests that the
fully protected apology is both good business and consistent with U.S. cultural values."); Brent T.
White, Say You're Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
1261, 1266 (2006) (examining the prevalent use of public apologies in the United States and arguing
that "public apologies are ubiquitous in American culture"); Rachel Zimmerman, Medical Contrition:
Doctors' New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying 'm Sory', WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at AI ("When a
medical mishap turned Linda Kenney's routine ankle surgery into a chilling brush with death, the
family quickly paid a visit to a lawyer's office. A jury, the family suspected, would likely show little
mercy to the anesthesiologist, Frederick van Pelt, who inadvertently injected a painkilling drug in the
wrong place, causing Ms. Kenney's heart to stop. To restart it, doctors ... sliced into her chest and
cracked open her rib cage.... But then, Dr. van Pelt broke with convention. Against the hospital's
advice, he wrote Ms. Kenney a personal letter saying he was 'deeply saddened' by her suffering. Later,
over coffee at a suburban diner, he apologized for the terrible accident. 'I found out he was a real
person,' Ms. Kenny says. 'He made an effort to seek me out and say he was sorry I suffered.' Moved
by the doctor's contrition, Ms. Kenney dropped her plans to sue.").
30 White, supra note 29, at 1271 (stating that thirty-seven percent of claimants "wouldn't have
filed suit had the doctor fully explained [the situation] and offered an apology to begin with").
31 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87-100 (2004) (examining defendants' remorse and
apology and recommending means to include such conduct into existing criminal procedure); Daniel
W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 180-81 (2000) (analyzing the
function of apology in tort cases and examining whether tort law should encourage apology).
32 See ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON 11 (2006) (suggesting that some injuries
"may be best repaired by study of the past injustice and by apology" and apologies can "be part of a
meaningful program of repair and reconciliation").
33 Martha Minow describes a sincere apology as one where "the apologizer assumes a position of
vulnerability before not only the victims but also the larger community." MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 114 (1998). Further, "[to] apologize is to declare voluntarily that one
has no excuse, defense, justification, or explanation for an action. .... Any diversion from accepting
responsibility is not an apology.... Full acceptance of responsibility by the wrongdoer is the hallmark
of an apology." Id. at 114-15. Similarly, Jeffrie G. Murphy wrote that a sincere apology requires
"remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the
aspects of one's character that generated the actions, the resolve to do one's best to extirpate those
aspects of one's character, and the resolve to atone or make amends .... " Jeffrie G. Murphy,
20121
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Scholars often note the moral dimension of apology in society, and ponder
whether apology is effective and whether apology's moral aspects would
remain intact when it is utilized in the legal regime.35
Looking back, a 1986 article in Law & Society Review opened a new
beginning for apology legal scholarship. Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur
Rosett discussed the implications of apology by comparing the role of
apology in Japan and the United States. 36 In the same issue, John 0. Haley
noted in his comment that apology scholarship finally received the
attention it deserved with the publication of Wagatsuma and Rosett's
article. He praised the article for providing a broader view on the
implications of apology. 37 Haley emphasized the parallels between Japan
and the United States on the use of apology, and argued that scholars
should conduct further inquiries on the role of apology in the U.S. legal
system. 38 As an example, Haley explained how the University Hospital in
Seattle, Washington included apologies as part of an early intervention
program to avoid medical malpractice litigation when a doctor is
responsible for unsatisfactory results of a treatment.39
In the immediately subsequent years, scholars devoted substantial
Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 143, 147
(Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement,
46 UCLA L. REv. 1801, 1815 (1999) (describing how apology constitutes "the wrongdoer's public
expression of his repentance, whereby he openly acknowledges his wrongdoing and simultaneously
disowns it").
34 See Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 303, 309
(2005) ("Research reveals that, often, what injured patients most desire are candid acknowledgements
of medical errors, a sincere apology that conveys genuine remorse, and constructive steps toward
corrective actions."); Michael B. Rainey et al., Characterized by Conciliation: Here's How Business
Can Use Apology to Diffuse Litigation, 26 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 131, 132 (2008) ("Literature
suggests the top three reasons for patients or their family members filing suit are (1) a lack of
explanation of what happened, (2) the perception that no one takes responsibility for their actions, and
(3) the demand that someone take measures to mitigate the offensive situation.").
35 See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819, 871-
72 (2002) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for and against having laws allowing the
inclusion of apology as a remedy); Lee Taft, Essay, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1146-49 (2000) (warning that apology is frequently commodified in the
legal arena and advocating in favor of "traditional evidentiary rules construing apologies as admissions
because such rules are important protectors of the moral dimension of apologetic discourse").
36 Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 461. Subsequently, the Wagatsuma and Rosett article
has been hailed as "influential" in apology literature. See White, supra note 29, at 1273 (noting that
Wagatsuma and Rosett identified the failure of the American legal system to encourage apologies in
cases where healing cannot be achieved by monetary compensation alone).
37 Haley, supra note 2, at 499-500, 504-06 (applauding Wagatsuma and Rosett for their
thoughtful analysis of the apology phenomenon in Japanese culture and law, and arguing that there is
much to learn from Japan on the implications of apology in addressing medical malpractice and
criminal cases in the United States).38 Id. at 505 (stating that in both the United States and Japan the apology is a critically important
behavioral determinant).
'9 Id at 505-06.
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efforts to developing scholarship on apology. They explored the
consequences of advising clients to apologize; 40 they also examined how
apology can serve as an effective tool in law reform. For instance, Daniel
W. Shuman discussed the role of apology in tort law and reform, noting
that, as the tort system is subject to attack for being both too costly and
inefficient, a way to reshape the tort system would be to encourage
apology for tortious conduct.41 Specifically, Shuman argued that tort law
should grant apology broader protection from admissibility in determining
a defendant's liability.42 As an apology for a tort has healing effects that
monetary damages alone cannot provide, apology as a remedy may reduce
damages for the wrongs.43 Accordingly, Shuman opined, tort law should
recognize the potential therapeutic impact of apology by allowing apology
in the damages phase to mitigate damages for intangible losses.44 Indeed,
by embracing what Shuman proposed in the medical malpractice field,
scholars advocate a shift from an adversary approach to a restorative
justice framework, with apology playing a key role in healing for patients,
doctors, and the community.45
Naturally, the substantial growth in apology scholarship is strong in the
criminal law area, particularly in restorative justice and victims' rights
46
movements. Notable scholars such as Stephanos Bibas and Richard A.
40 Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1014, 1023-30
(1999) (analyzing the consequences of advising clients to apologize).
41 See Shuman, supra note 31, at 180 ("An apology has the potential to help people who have
suffered serious emotional harm through the wrongdoing of others in ways that monetary damages
alone cannot.").4 2
1d. at 181.
43 Id. at 189.
See id (recognizing that an apology may be a more effective form of restoration for the
claimant than money).
45 Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 59
(2005) (exploring the "healing possibilities of apology in the face of medical mistake" and asserting
that "authentic expression of remorse should be given voice, not only because morally and ethically it
is the right thing to do, but also because it is potentially spiritually healing for both the patient and the
physician"); Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Refraining Medical
Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 710-12 (2006) (identifying the benefits of the restorative
model to reform medical malpractice and discussing apology and emotional restoration for both
patients and doctors).
46 See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader, "Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned": Why Repentance and the
Criminal Justice System Do Not Mix-A Lesson from Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 70-71
(2003) (critiquing the Georgia Justice Project's use of confessions in criminal adjudication and
contrasting it with the Jewish legal system); Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 301 (2007) (examining the role of apologies in plea
bargaining and plea negotiations); Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, andAtonement,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 303, 303 (arguing that punishment of the offender is essential to restorative
justice); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992) ("[B]y apologizing, we deny the diminishment of the victim, and our
relative elevation, expressed by our wrongful action."); Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the
Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 293-94 (discussing genuine
2012]
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Bierschbach detailed the prevalent and proper use of apology in American
life and provided rationale for the inclusion of apology in criminal law.4 7
They proposed ways in which to integrate apology into criminal
procedures. For instance, they examined at what state of the criminal
process apology should be integrated.48 Although there are difficulties in
implementing apology into the criminal justice system, they noted that
apology has become more common in other areas of the law, such as
corporate wrongdoings, and therefore criminal law should remove
49roadblocks and provide opportunities for apology to occur.
Likewise, in the area of alternative dispute resolution, scholars have
explored the role of apology in mediation, ° negotiation, and conflict
resolutions. 51  They recognized that apology is a better fit in alternative
dispute resolution than in the adversarial system, and that the use of
apology in these areas yields many benefits.52 Some scholars suggested a
place for sincere apology in mediation disputes before litigation. 3
Consequently, they advocated for an increased use of apology in all dispute
remorse by the offender as the second stage of a successful restorative justice process); Toni M.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1912-13 (1991)
(discussing the use of shaming in white colonial America); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and
Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 423, 429 (2007) (examining apology and remorse in the context of
sentencing and clemency decisions); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Met-Remorse, Apology, and
Criminal Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 372 (2006) (exploring the relationship between apology
and the states of remorse and guilt); Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research
on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 167, 190 tbl.7, 191 fig.7
(reviewing four studies of offenders' apologies and the likelihood of forgiveness in restorative justice);
Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REv. 15, 15 (examining restorative justice as compared to conventional justice).
47 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 31, at 87 (stating that remorse and apology should be
incorporated into the criminal arena since victims of crimes have greater wounds and need the most
healing).48 Id. at 128-35 (evaluating the incorporation of apology from the beginning of the criminal
process through mediation).49 Id. at 145-47 (examining the costs and difficulties of implementing remorse and apology).
50 See Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First
Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 829, 865-66 (2003) (stating that mediation rather than
litigation is the appropriate forum for apology); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in
Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1168, 1172-75 (1997) (creating a vocabulary for discussing
apology for use in analyzing the potential of apology in dispute resolution).
51 See Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation,
48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 545, 546 (2000) (comparing the uses and effects of apology in the United States
and Japan in mediation); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role ofApology in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L.
REv. 665, 666 (2004) (examining the purposes of apology in criminal, civil cases, and alternative
disputes).
52 Bolstad, supra note 51, at 569-71 (discussing apology benefits in mediation cases); Brown,
supra note 51, at 667-68 (noting how apology is used in other areas of law and articulating benefits of
apology in alternative disputes).
53 See, e.g., Pavlick, supra note 50, at 830-31 (discussing mediation as a forum for dispute
settlement).
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resolution.54
Some scholars took an additional step, suggesting court-ordered
apology as a remedy in cases involving defamation"5 and civil rights. 6 In
the reparations context, numerous scholars have examined the role of
institutionss7 or governments in making apologies as a healing measure for
mass injustice-such as slavery58 or Japanese internment.5 9  Some shared
the view that a sincere apology is more valuable and meaningful to victims
than money.60
As apology scholarship evolved into a more mature and collective
inquiry, scholars provided empirical data on the use of apology in
settlements6' and negotiations.62  They tested the value of apology and
suggested that sincere and substantive apology may improve the level of
trust between parties in a negotiation situation." They applied
'4 See, e.g., Bolstad, supra note 51, at 578 (stating that the benefits of apology in dispute
resolution are underutilized in American society and advocating for its increased use in the forum of
mediation); Brown, supra note 51, at 667-68 (noting how apology is used in multiple legal dispute
resolution forums); Deborah Levi, Why Not Just Apologize? How to Say You're Sorry in ADR, 18
ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 163 (2000) (exploring the factors that contribute to the practicability
of a meaningful apology); Carl D. Schneider, What It Means to Be Sony: The Power of Apology in
Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 265, 274 (2000) (discussing the place for apology in American law).
" See, e.g., Dai-Kwon Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-Ordered Apology for
Defamatory Remarks, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 205 (2000) (stating that Korean case law
often suggests court-ordered publication of apology as a proper remedial measure for defamation).
56 See, e.g., White, supra note 29, at 1265 (proposing "that civil rights plaintiffs in lawsuits
against government defendants should be entitled to pursue court-ordered apologies as an equitable
remedy").
57 Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro, Truth Matters: A Call for the American Bar Association to Acknowledge
Its Past and Make Reparations to African Descendants, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 51, 93 (2007)
("[Rieparations scholars and activists have called for an apology for slavery and Jim Crow .... ).
58 Roy L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS
142-43 (2004) (providing a compelling moral theory of reparations relying on apology and asserting
that "atonement-apology and reparation-plus forgiveness leads to racial reconciliation").
59 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 363-68 (1987) (discussing how Japanese-Americans have organized a
movement to obtain compensation for their internment, a constitutional violation, during World War
II); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Essay, American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1275-77 (2003)
(discussing the formal presidential apology given to Japanese-American survivors of World War II
internment camps through the Civil Liberties Act of 1988).
60 BROPHY, supra note 32, at 11 ("[A] sincere apology may be more valuable and meaningful to
some victims than money.").
6' See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 484-91 (2003) (discussing empirical evidence of the effect of apologies on
legal settlement decision-making).
62 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (2008) (emphasizing psychological responses of both claimants and
attomeys to apologies and how apologies influence negotiations).
63 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 147-50 (1994) (discussing equity-seeking experiments
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evolutionary economic and biologic explanations to apology.64  They
extended apology as part of a solution after providing a feminist critique of
the problems in evidence law.65 Some noted that victims of spousal abuse
and physician negligence are often more inclined to forgive and accept
apology.66 Moreover, scholars began systematically to evaluate apologies
tailored toward legal solutions, 67 and critically examined the pros and cons
of legislating apology.68  Some scholars raised their concerns about the
subversion of apology as it may be abused through commodification.69
In recent years, apology became recognized as "important" in
American culture and law. Between 1986 and 2009, thirty-five states
encouraged apologies by enacting statutes designed to provide evidentiary
protection for apologetic expressions. 70 Empirical studies on apology
reveal that protected apologies will foster settlement between adversarial
testing the value of apology and concluding that "[p]erhaps a more sincere or more substantive apology
could restore equity to [a harmed] relationship").
64 Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1148
(2002) ("Biochemical and physiological changes combined with the individual's developmental and
environmental history [affect] the emotional state or feelings that shape behavior surrounding apology
and forgiveness.").
65 Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy
Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1999) (proposing a new evidence rule
that would except apologies by party-opponents from admission at trial).
66 Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors
Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1082-84 (2004) (comparing excessive
forgiveness among domestic violence victims and victims of negligent doctors).
67 Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 302 (2001) (examining the various criticism of apologies tailored
toward legal solutions).
68 See Cohen, supra note 35, at 819-24 (presenting the pros and cons of legislation concerning the
admissibility of apologies as proof of fault in civil cases).
69 Taft, supra note 35, at 1156 (stating that a truly repentant offender admits his wrongdoing and
accepts the consequences of his offense rather than distancing himself from those consequences).
70 Runnels, supra note 29, at 151-57 (discussing how thirty-five states between 1986 and 2009
enacted statutes that encourage apologies). The statutes include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605
(Supp. 2011) (West); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1)
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d(b) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318(b) (Supp. 2010);
FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1
(Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207(1) (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1901(b) (West
Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-4 (LexisNexis 2008); IOWA CODE § 622.31 (Supp. 2011);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907(2) (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2000); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201(1)
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (Supp. 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190(B) (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 19-12-14 (Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 2008); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-3-422(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.64.010(2) (2009); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11 a(b)(1)
(2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130(a) (2011); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1(a) (2003); H.B. 1333, 60th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007). Runnels, supra note 28, at 151 n.70.
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parties.71  Moreover, court-ordered apologies have been accepted as
promoting psychological healing and social justice, restoring social
equilibrium, and serving as an inducement for changed behavior.72
B. Apology in Statutes, Decisional Law, and Practice-A Brief Survey
1. Statutes
Apologies have moved from the arena of theoretical scholarship to
hard law. Recognizing the benefits of apologies, many states have
protected the conduct by enacting and codifying acceptance of apologetic
gestures and statements into statutes.73  For example, Florida's relevant
statute provides:
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures
expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence
relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person
involved in an accident and made to that person or to the
family of that person shall be inadmissible as evidence in a
civil action.74
Under this statute, an apologetic gesture or statement will be protected
from being considered as evidence against the apologizing person.
Similarly, under Ohio's statute on the use of a defendant's statement in
a medical liability action, statements, gestures, or conduct expressing
apology made by a health care provider to an alleged victim are
"inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an
admission against interest. 75 Defendants generally request that the court
not admit the apology into evidence.76
Oregon's statute explicitly states that any expression of regret or
apology made by a person licensed by the Oregon Medical Board or on
behalf of that person does not constitute an admission of liability for that
71 See Robbennolt, supra note 61, at 491 ("Only the full, responsibility-accepting apology
increased the likelihood that the offer would be accepted."); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know
and Don't Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1009, 1015-21 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies relating to apology in the context of medical
malpractice cases).
72 White, supra note 29, at 1273-92 (illustrating the benefits of court-ordered apologies in the
civil rights context).
73 See supra note 70 (listing relevant statutes).
74 FLA. STA. § 90.4026(2). The statute also provides that "[a] statement of fault, however, which
is part of, or in addition to, any of the above shall be admissible pursuant to this section." ld.
75 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A).
76 Hill v. St. Onge, No. 2:06-cv-329, 2009 WL 2833145, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2009) (granting
the defendant's motion in limine, prohibiting testimony concerning statements or gestures of apology
attributed to defendant doctors).
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person.7 The protection covers an apology that is made in writing, orally,
or by conduct.78 Further, the statute prohibits the examination by
deposition "or otherwise in any civil or administrative proceeding,
including any arbitration or mediation proceeding, with respect to an
expression of regret or apology" made by a person licensed by the Oregon
Medical Board or on behalf of that person.79
The statutes above are among the thirty-five state statutes designed to
encourage and protect apology. 80 The first state that extended protection
for apology was Massachusetts; the catalyst for the adoption of the statute
was the fatal accident of a legislator's daughter, as recounted by apology
scholar Lee Taft:
In the 1970s a Massachusetts legislator's daughter was
killed while riding her bicycle. The driver who struck her
never apologized. Her father, a state senator, was angry
that the driver had not expressed contrition. He was told
that the driver dared not risk apologizing, because it could
have constituted an admission in the litigation surrounding
the girl's death. Upon his retirement, the senator and his
successor presented the legislature with a bill designed to
create a "safe harbor" for would-be apologizors [sic]."
Overall, state statutes encourage parties to make apologies or gestures
of sympathy and compassion as warranted under the circumstances,
without fear of subsequent liability through admission. The statutes are
specifically indicative of the positive influences of apology in healing
patients and reducing the high cost associated with medical malpractice
law litigation.82
" OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2009) ("(1) For the purposes of any civil action against a person
licensed by the Oregon Medical Board, any expression of regret or apology made by or on behalf of the
person, including an expression of regret or apology that is made in writing, orally or by conduct, does
not constitute an admission of liability for any purpose. (2) A person who is licensed by the Oregon
Medical Board, or any other person who makes an expression of regret or apology on behalf of a
person who is licensed by the Oregon Medical Board, may not be examined by deposition or otherwise
in any civil or administrative proceeding, including any arbitration or mediation proceeding, with
respect to an expression of regret or apology made by or on behalf of the person, including expressions
of regret or apology that are made in writing, orally or by conduct.").
78 Id.
79 id.
80 Runnels, supra note 29, at 151.
81 Taft, supra note 35, at 1151.
82 See Valerie B. Hedrick, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Bandaging Oregon's
Wounded System and Protecting Physicians, 43 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 363, 392 (2007) (noting how
apology statutes indicate the changing perspective on physician apologies and that apology "provides a
means to reduce the exorbitant amounts required to settle and defend against malpractice disputes");
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2. Courts and Apologies
Commentators have noted numerous cases where courts have ordered
defendants to apologize for their reprehensible conduct. For example, a
court in Ohio ordered corporate polluters to write letters of apology for
their environmental crime of contaminating the groundwater with
carcinogenic chemicals and to publish newspaper advertisements
describing their polluting conduct.83 A Texas court ordered a teenager who
vandalized schools to apologize to the students at those schools.84 A court
in Alabama ordered the district attorney in Tuscaloosa to write a letter of
apology for illegally using his opponent's criminal background information
in a 1998 political race.85 Of course, if the defendant fails to heed the
court's apology order, there are consequences. For example, a defendant
who failed to apologize as a condition of probation was ordered to attend
"empathy training" by a court in New Hampshire.86
A search of electronic legal databases on decisional law regarding
apology reveals that courts have adopted a wide range of approaches.
Some courts rejected apologies while others welcomed them. At one end
of the spectrum, courts believed that, under the adversary system, the law
"is not usually concerned with procuring apologies to make morally right a
legal wrong done to the plaintiff., 87 For example, in Woodruff, a gender
discrimination and retaliation case, the district court ruled that monetary
damages alone could not remedy the injury caused by the defendant's
reprehensible conduct. Accordingly, the district court ordered the
defendant to apologize to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held
that the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered the
defendant to apologize. The court reasoned that the order was for the
purpose of "righting moral wrongs," and that the apology would not
provide any remedy to the plaintiff "for which the damages imposed have
not already accounted. 8 8 Similarly, in some racial and sexual harassment
see also Zimmerman, supra note 29, at AI (describing the impact of a physician's apology letter on the
patient's decision not to bring an action against the doctor).83 Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 367 (1999) (citing Richard Phillips, Shame as
a Deterrent, CHI. TIuB., July 27, 1988, at C20).
84 Latif, supra note 67, at 296-97.
85 Bowen, supra note 26, at Al.
86 White, supra note 29, at 1269 (describing the event and court order and citing Alan J. Keays,
Court: Man Must Work on Empathy Issues, RUTLAND HERALD, May 17, 2005, at B I).
87 Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002); see id. (holding that the court
exceeded its equitable power when it ordered the defendant to apologize); see also McKee v. Turner,
491 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1974) (opining that the courts "are not commissioned to run around
getting apologies" in a case where the plaintiff only requested an apology).
88 Woodruff, 29 F. App'x at 346; see also Griffith v. Smith, No. LT-460-2, 1993 WL 945995, at
*13 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1993) (rejecting an apology for filing a frivolous law suit as "post-hoc
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cases, courts found that apologies are insufficient to rectify the taint of
discrimination and therefore fail to serve the purposes of Title VII.
89
In an older case, a plaintiff brought an action against a U.S. Attorney
for sending an allegedly defamatory letter to the chief judge for the District
of Oregon. The plaintiff changed the prayer of relief from monetary
damages to an apology, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as de
minimis for failing to present a justiciable controversy. 90 The Ninth Circuit
stated, "we are not commissioned to run around getting apologies."91
Similarly, in a discrimination case in which a cemetery refused to bury the
remains of an individual on the basis of race, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed a lower court's order requiring the cemetery to issue a
public letter of apology to the widow of the deceased.92 The court
determined that a letter of apology would be superfluous in light of the
previously required advertisement proclaiming that the cemetery no longer
adhered to its "all-Caucasian poli[y]."93 A concurring justice in that case
further explained that ordering a public apology is beyond the reach of
government, characterizing it as ordering an expression of emotion, and
that doing so is to "advocate tyranny.
94
Some courts articulated First Amendment concerns which precluded
them from ordering apology as a remedy. For instance, in Griffith v.
Smith, the plaintiffs attorney failed to conduct a reasonable pre-filing
inquiry and faced sanctions.95 The defendant requested that an appropriate
sanction should include attorney's fees, costs, and an apology.96 The court
rationalizations" and imposing sanction by ordering counsel for the plaintiff to pay $5000 to the
defendants).
9 George-Sexton v. Lewis, No. 06-6120-CV-W-HFS, 2009 WL 804070, at *9-10 (W.D. Mo.
Mar. 25, 2009) (noting "an apology, in and of itself, was insufficient" because Title VII requires "more
than a mere request to refrain from discriminatory conduct") (citing Davis v. Tri-State Mack
Distributors, Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1992)). In George-Sexton, the sole owner of a
business entity that employed plaintiff was the sexual harasser, in referring to the defendant's apology,
the court wrote, "it is difficult to discern if defendant's apology and assurances were adequate to
alleviate any taint of discriminatory conduct because plaintiff resigned." Id.; see also Canady v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 452 F.3d 1020, 1021 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that apologies were meaningless when
preceded and followed by racial epithets).
9 McKee, 491 F.2d at 1107.
91 Id.; see also Tackett v. KRIV-TV, Civ. A. No. H-93-3699, 1994 WL 591637, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
May 5, 1994) (denying, in a case involving libel and slander claims, equitable relief in the form of a
retraction or public apology, stating that the only relief for defamation is damages); Frederick v. Shaw,
No. CIV. A. 92-0592, 1994 WL 57213, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994) (holding in a defamation case
that the plaintiff's request for an apology "finds no support in the law" and that the appropriate remedy
under Pennsylvania law for defamation is damages, not apology).
92 Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881, 890 (Pa.
1973).
93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Id. at 891 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
9 Griffith, 1993 WL 945995, at *13.
9Id.
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awarded the defendant monetary compensation, but declined to issue an
order for apology, reasoning that the First Amendment "protects both the
right to speak and the right to remain silent."97
On the other hand, courts have upheld apologies as remedies in cases
involving perjury, wrongful discharge of employment, First Amendment
violations, and attorney disciplinary actions, among others.98 Courts have
also accepted apologies as mitigating factors in assessing damages. In a
Ninth Circuit perjury case in which a condition of probation required the
defendants to publish an apology, the defendants challenged the lower
court's order under the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. 99
The Ninth Circuit upheld the apology requirement as reasonably serving
the purpose of rehabilitation. 0°
Likewise, in a wrongful discharge case in which the defendant
appealed a trial court's grant of the plaintiff's request for equitable relief in
the form of a public apology, the First Circuit upheld the relief on the
grounds that the defendant failed to file the appropriate post-trial written
objection.01 Similarly, in a case regarding whether a school administration
could order a student to apologize for his disruptive behavior, the court
found that requiring an apology was not a violation of the First
Amendment and was "well within the ambit of an institution's balanced
'comprehensive authority.""0112  Additionally, in an attorney disciplinary
action, the magistrate judge ordered the attorney to write apology letters to
certain judges and a court clerk as part of the requirements to permit the
attorney to return to practice. 10
With respect to apologies as a mitigating factor in assessing
appropriateness of remedies, several courts have recognized meaningful
apologies and accepted them as an important mitigating factor. For
example, in a bankruptcy case in which a creditor violated the discharge
injunction, the creditor's issuance of an apology was held to be a
mitigating factor.'0 4 Similarly, in a libel case, a federal district court
97 Id. (citing In re Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525, 529
(N.Y. 1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (relying on the First Amendment and criticizing the majority for
upholding the order of apology)).
98 See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
99 United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1990).
'o Id. at 848 ("It is almost axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation of an offender is the
offender's recognition that he was at fault.") (citing Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th
Cir. 1968)).
101 Desjardins v. Van Buren Cmty. Hosp., 969 F.2d 1280, 1282 (1st Cir. 1992).
102 Kicklighter v. Evans Cnty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 719 (S.D. Ga. 1997); see also In re
Imperial Diner, Inc., 417 N.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (refusing to consider the question of
whether the lower court's order of a public apology violated the First Amendment).
03 In re R. Michael Moity, Jr., Misc. No. 07-0001, 2008 WL 104209, at *11 (W.D. La. Jan. 9,
2008).
'04 In re Lafferty, 229 B.R. 707, 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998).
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applied Texas law and held that public apologies are "relevant to
mitigation of damages."' 0 5 Finally, in several attorney disciplinary cases,
the courts considered, and weighed heavily, the attorney's apology in
determining whether a suspension was appropriate and in determining the
proper duration of such suspensions. 1
06
IV. U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND REMEDIES
Federal intellectual property law in the United States is as old as the
country itself. The members of the Constitutional Convention included the
Patent and Copyright Clause in the Constitution, 0 7 and Congress passed
various federal statutes protecting intellectual property in 1790 during the
First Session of Congress.1
08
Intellectual property generally refers to patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets. A patent is a grant issued by the United
States Patent Office for an invention satisfying statutory requirements of
patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and
enablement.'0 9 A patent lasts twenty years from the date of filing the
105 Nowak v. Am. W. Airlines, No. 1:08-CV-613, 2008 WL 4966054, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18,
2008) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.003(a)(3) (West 2008) ("Public apologies are
relevant to mitigation of damages in state actions for libel.")).
106 Ginzberg v. Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV 950550507, 1995 WL 781406, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1995) ("[A]lthough the plaintiffs remark was unquestionably disrespectful, his
immediate and repeated abject apologies took the sting out of the insult and should have sufficed to put
the matter permanently to rest.... A prompt and unconditional apology, such as occurred here, is as
much a part of the attorney's conduct to be reviewed as is the offense. And it should be a significant
mitigating factor in judging the seriousness of the offense."); In re Discipline of Getty, 401 N.W.2d
668, 671 (Minn. 1987) (declining to suspend the attorney from practice upon noting that the attorney
has made numerous apologies since the disciplinary proceedings have been brought against him and
"appears to realize the error of his ways and has the will to correct them"); Disciplinary Counsel v.
Roberts, 881 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ohio 2008) (accepting, as a mitigating factor, the attorney's
willingness to "accept responsibility for his mistakes, as shown by his often repeated apologies,
[which] persuades us that he will not repeat his misconduct").
107 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1148-49
(reviewing all records relating to the inclusion of the Patent and Copyright Clause in the Constitution,
and concluding that James Madison and Charles Pinckney were "primary forces behind the addition of
the Clause" and that the Clause was unanimously adopted without recorded debate).
'08 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (first patent statute); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1,
I Stat. 124 (1790) (first copyright statute); see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347
(1908) (noting the first copyright act was passed by the first session of congress in 1790); Don E.
Tomlinson & Christopher R. Harris, Free-Lance Photojournalism in a Digital World: Copyright,
Lanham Act and Droit Moral Considerations Plus a Sui Generis Solution, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 12
(1992) (providing an account of the early history of copyright statutes).
109 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (noting
that an invention must be useful, novel, not obvious, and enabling in order to be issued as a patent);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (interpreting Section 101 of the patent statute and
holding that living things are patentable subject matter); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
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patent application. 10 A copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights to
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display a work of authorship that meets the threshold of
originality requirement and is expressed in a tangible medium.I"l The term
of copyright protection is the life of the natural author plus seventy
years."i2  If the work of authorship is a work made for hire, the entity
author's copyright will last for ninety-five years from registration, or one
hundred and twenty years from creation." 3 For trademarks, federal law
allows owners of a valid trademark the exclusive right to use the trademark
against junior users of trademarks that may cause a likelihood of consumer
confusion."14  When the owner of a trademark abandons its trademark by
non-use, coupled with the intention not to resume use, trademark
protection ceases." 5 Also, if the trademark owner allows the trademark to
become a generic term, protection is no longer available, as the generic
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.").
110Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that in 1994, Congress
changed the term of a patent from seventeen years from issuance date to twenty years from filing date);
see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994)
(establishing, in public law form, that the patent term shall be for twenty years from the date on which
the patent application was filed).
"' See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 (2001) (stating that the Copyright Act of
1976 refrained copyright as a bundle of discrete "exclusive rights"); see also Whitney Broussard, The
Promise and Peril of Collective Licensing, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 21, 25 n.9 (2009) (noting that
copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights as enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106). With the arrival of the
Internet, Congress passed new legislation to protect copyright owners from widespread online
copyright infringement. See Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized
Copyright Protection over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61
RUTGERS L. REV. 627, 645-46 (2009).
112 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003) (affirming the constitutionality of the copyright
extension of twenty years for a total term of life of the author plus seventy years); see also 17 U.S.C. §
302(a) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except
as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70
years after the author's death.").
"3 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
114 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004);
Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an
Accounting of Defendant's Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 872 (2002) ("Trademark
infringement does not depend upon the use of identical words, nor whether they are so similar that a
person looking at one would be deceived into the belief that it was the other. Infringement exists if one
adopts a trade name or a trademark, so like another in form, spelling, or sound that one with an unclear
recollection of the real trademark is likely to become confused or misled.").
115 See Christopher T. Micheletti, Preventing Loss of Trademark Rights: Quantitative and
Qualitative Assessments of "Use " and Their Impact on Abandonment Determinations, 94 TRADEMARK
REP. 634, 634-35 (2004) (discussing how protective trademark rights derive from the actual use of the
trademark for commercial purposes); see also Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45-47 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding abandonment of the Amos & Andy trademark based on twenty-one years of nonuse,
despite the trademark holder's intent to resume use if "the social climate become[s] more hospitable").
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term is free to all for usage.' 16  A trade secret refers to the information,
formula, or process, not known by the public, that is capable of deriving
independent economic means.' 17 A trade secret owner has the right to
bring a misappropriation claim against others for the use of improper
means to obtain the trade secrets. 18 A trade secret loses its legal protection
when it is no longer a secret." 9
Unlike real property, intellectual property protection is a mixture of
property and liability rules.12 0  Accordingly, remedies for intellectual
property infringement reflect the byproduct of the mixed regime.' 2' The
116 Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, defines abandonment of a trademark.
Specifically,
[a] mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" when either of the following
occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.
Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3
consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use" of a
mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade,
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well
as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or
services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its
significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining
abandonment under this paragraph.
Id.
117 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1, 5 (2009) ("A trade secret can be any information of value used in one's business that
has been kept secret and provides an economic advantage over competitors.").
1. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the
Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1425, 1429-30 (2009) (discussing the typical trade secret misappropriation
case and the law to protect trade secrets against misappropriation in order to promote fair competition);
see also Brooks W. Taylor, Comment, You Can 't Say That!: Enjoining Publication of Trade Secrets
Despite the First Amendment, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 393, 394-95 (2005) (explaining the
importance of trade secret protection to companies in the marketplace).
119 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371, 377-80 (2002)
(explaining the legal life of a trade secret and reasons for companies to seek trade secret protection
instead of patents).
120 Erez Shaham & Noam Sher, A Purchaser of a Product v. An Owner of Stolen Intellectual
Property: The Revival of the Accession Rule, 28 WHITIrER L. REv. 319, 353-54 (2006) (discussing the
"property rule," which allows intellectual property holders to recover the assets, and the "liability rule,"
which affords intellectual property owners compensation for the infringement).
121 Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 47-48 (1999)
(noting that copyright remedies are provided under both property rules and liability rules, and that the
"property-like" statutory provisions include "those permitting injunctive relief and the
supercompensatory disgorgement and destruction remedies" while the "liability rule" statutory
provisions "authorize the use of copyrighted works without prior bargaining with the entitlement
holder" such as compulsory licensing).
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two most common and prominent remedies for intellectual property
infringement are injunctions and damages. 122
A. Injunction as Remedy
Injunctive relief in intellectual property law has its roots in real
property rules. Under a normative property rights regime, the owner of
123
real property has the right to exclude others from the property. The
owner can expect the courts to protect the property from present and future
interference by issuing an injunction against those trespassing on the land
or interfering with the owner's enjoyment of his or her land. 2 4 Injunctive
relief in real property law permeates intangible property law.'2 5 Extending
the normative property rights regime to intellectual property law, the
owner of intellectual property has the right to use the intellectual property.
Conversely, the infringer has no right to use or continue to use the
intellectual property even after the infringer pays damages caused by
unauthorized use. The intellectual property owner is entitled to an
injunction against the infringer as a matter of course. 126
Injunctive relief is powerful. For example, owners of trademarks,
copyrights, trade secrets, and patents, or parties with proper standing,
routinely seek judicial assistance in obtaining an injunction against
122 James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
555, 557-58 (2010) (recognizing the traditional identification of injunction with "property rules" and
damages with "liability rules" in intellectual property remedies cases).
123 Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730
(1998) (advocating that the "right to exclude" is the "sine qua non" of property); see generally David
L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A Fundamental
Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 39 (2000) (reviewing case law on the "right to exclude"
as a fundamental right in ownership of land).
124 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 598 (2008) (emphasizing the right to exclude
in property law is "a remedial attribute related to the automatic availability of injunctive relief for
interferences with an owner's use and enjoyment of her property").
125 See Dariush Keyhani, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 9
(2008) ("Just the same as real property owners may exclude others from entering their property, but are
not forced to rent a vacant property at any price, a patent grants the right to exclude others from
entering their property and creates no obligation to sell or license (akin to rent) that property."); see
also Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 61, 68
(2009) (noting that the parallels between real property and intellectual property have led to the
conclusion that "the law should provide the holders of each with inviolable exclusive rights, the breach
of which gives rise to automatic injunctive relief'). Injunctive relief, but not automatic injunctive
relief, however, is available in patent infringement cases. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
126 Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 488 (2010) (recognizing that the Federal
Circuit had a strong preference for injunctive relief in patent cases and that the preference came from
"the definition of property as the right to exclude," and that patent law provides an "exclusive right to
inventors to make, use and vend their invention") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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infringers. 127  Both intellectual property statutes and decisional law vest
courts with the power to grant an injunction in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent violation of intellectual property rights on
such terms as the court deems reasonable. 128 In patent infringement, if an
injunction is obtained, infringers must halt all marketing, selling, offering
to sell, importing, or manufacturing of products based on the patent in
suit.129 If the injunction is imminent, the mere threat of injunction is often
serious enough to force the infringer to negotiate, compromise, or accept
the conditions set forth by the intellectual property owners.
30
In both trademark and copyright infringement cases, the plaintiff must
demonstrate probable success on the merits of the case to obtain a
preliminary injunction. 3' For example, in a trademark case the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant's use of the trademark is likely to cause
consumer confusion.132 The plaintiff must convince the court that, on the
127 Fischer, supra note 122, at 557-58 (noting that the normative view of damages remedies is that
they are not as powerful as injunctive remedies because damages remedies empower third parties to
violate rights and pay damages, whereas injunctive remedies provide the right-holder the power to
prevent others from using the right without the holder's consent).
128 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (patent injunction); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (trademark injunction); 17
U.S.C. § 502 (copyright injunction); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (1985) (trade secret injunction).
129 See, e.g., Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the
district court's decision holding the defendants in contempt of a preliminary order enjoining
importation of infringing cameras in violation of the plaintiffs patent). In trade secret cases,
injunctions may continue for an additional period of time, even after the trade secret has ceased to exist,
"in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the
misappropriation." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (trade secret injunction).
130 See Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 293 (2007) ("Companies are compelled to pay the fees because injunctions can
have extremely severe economic consequences and can significantly damage reputations.").
131 See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A] party
must demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury if relief is not granted, or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits
and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor."); see also Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v.
Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the lower court,
considering the likelihood of success on the merits at preliminary injunction, "correctly held that to be
liable for trademark infringement, someone must (1) use in commerce (2) any word, false designation
of origin, false or misleading description, or representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause
confusion or misrepresents the characteristics of his or another person's goods or services"). The court
properly cited the factors listed in AMPfI nc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979),
to determine the likelihood of confusion for the Wobenzym mark.
132 See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 877 (holding that the lower court had properly cited
the factors in Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-49, to determine the likelihood of confusion for the trademark
at issue. The Sleekcraft court articulated eight non-exhaustive factors relevant to a determination of
likelihood of confusion. These include:
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks;
(4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods
and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's
intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
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merits, it will probably succeed on the likelihood of consumer confusion
test. Seeking the preliminary injunction before trial is imperative. The
harm is irreparable, as the trademark owner has no ability to control the
nature and quality of the defendant's goods, and it is "virtually impossible
to ascertain the precise economic consequences" of the harm to the
reputation and goodwill of a trademark. 33 The continuing distribution and
sales of the defendant's goods affixed by the infringing mark will corrode
the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffis mark while the litigation is
unfolding. 134 Accordingly, some courts have presumed irreparable harm if
the trademark owner can demonstrate the likelihood of success on the
merits. 35  Other courts, however, have declined to extend the presumption
of irreparable harm.
136
Copyright owners have also enjoyed the presumption of irreparable
harm,137 but the presumption has been called into question in recent years
in both copyright and trademark infringements. 138 The presumption rests
on judicial recognition of the short life of a copyrighted work in the
marketplace, which will often "last only until the next fad"; 139 therefore,
Id.
33 Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992).
134 Int'l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092 (7th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that the "most corrosive and irreparable harm attributable to trademark infringement is the
inability of the victim to control the nature and quality of the defendants' goods. Even if the infringer's
products are of high quality, the plaintiff can properly insist that its reputation should not be imperiled
by the acts of another.") (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858
(7th Cir. 1982)).
135 See, e.g., El Polio Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In a trademark
infringement claim, irreparable injury may be presumed from a showing of likelihood of success on the
merits.") (quoting GoTo.Com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000)); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Irreparable harm is generally
presumed in cases of trademark infringement and dilution."); Processed Plastic Co., 675 F.2d at 858
("This and many other Courts have often recognized that the damages occasioned by trademark
infringement are by their very nature irreparable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for
remedy at law."); see also Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DirecTV Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 151-54 (2d Cir.
2007) (applying a presumption of irreparable harm in a false comparative advertising claim under the
Lanham Act for trademarks).
136 See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227-28 (1lth Cir.
2008) (ruling that the four-factor analysis for granting an injunction, regardless of whether permanent
or preliminary injunction is sought, must be evaluated by courts as the Lanham Act is similar to the
Patent Acts, which grants federal courts the power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable).
'
37 W. Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the
general rule that in copyright inftingement cases "a showing of a primafacie case raises a presumption
of irreparable harm" at preliminary injunction); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc, v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,
558 F.2d 1090, 1094 (2d Cir. 1977) (same).
138 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the traditionally used
presumption standard has been abrogated by eBay).
139 Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 843 F.2d 600, 611 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The
popular demand for a new literary, musical, sculptural or other 'work of authorship,' often may last
2012]
CONNECTICUT LAWREVIEW
the commercial value of the copyrighted work may evaporate by the time
the litigation concludes. Without the presumption of irreparable harm at
the preliminary injunction stage, the copyright owner will not be able to
build name recognition for its work during the entire litigation due to the
infringer's ongoing conduct. The success finally obtained at the
conclusion of the long litigation would be rendered meaningless, as the
public did not know the true author behind the work.140  Moreover, when
courts presume irreparable harm to the copyright owner after the owner
successfully establishes the likelihood of success in the copyright
infringement claims on the merits, the public interest is served by the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.141
Likewise, in trade secret misappropriation cases, injunctive relief is
available to the owner to prevent the defendant's continued use of the
misappropriated trade secrets.142 This enables them to manufacture goods
and directly compete with the owner in the marketplace, without which the
defendant could not compete. 43  Injunction serves to right competitive
only until the next fad.... In such situations, the commercial value of the copyright owner's tangible
expression, appropriated by an infringer, may be lost by the time litigation on the claim is complete.")
(internal citations omitted).
141 See id. at 611 ("The ultimate commercial success of an 'artist' often depends on name
recognition and reputation with the value and popularity of each succeeding work depending upon the
'name' established through commercial exploitation of preceding works. This can be true whether the
'artist' creates musical compositions, video games, or concrete statues. Any ultimate success in a
lawsuit could have little effect on public perception of who the true creator was.").
141 Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1254-55 (reversing the lower court's finding of no irreparable
harm, and stating that "the public interest underlying the copyright law requires a presumption of
irreparable harm" because "Congress has elected to grant certain exclusive rights to the owner of a
copyright in a protected work, it is virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be served by
upholding copyright protections and, correspondingly, preventing the misappropriation of the skills,
creative energies, and resources which are invested in the protected work"), In trademark infringement
cases, courts also find that public interest dictates trademarks be protected against use causing the
likelihood of consumer confusion. See Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112,
115 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[A]s a matter of public policy, trademarks should be protected against infringing
uses.").
142 For example, under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/3 (West
2009), the law provides for the issuance of injunctions to prohibit actual or threatened misappropriation
of a trade secret. Also, Illinois law presumes irreparable harm because such harm would occur in the
absence of injunctive relief if trade secrets are misappropriated. See Jano Justice Sys., Inc. v. Burton,
636 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp.
2d 688, 700 (N.D. Il. 2004).
143 Illustratively, in Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., the court found that the
defendant, EKTouch, had misappropriated the plaintiff's trade secrets and that if the defendant began
marketing its ERGO Roller to customers, it would injure the plaintiff's "existing relationships with its
customers, who (as has already happened in one documented instance) may well view the ERGO
Roller as a superior and cheaper alternative to [plaintiff's] existing product line." No. 09-cv-451-JL,
2010 WL 174315, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 14, 2010).
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wrongs.' 44 The public interest generally favors fair competition in the
marketplace; it thus dictates the issuance of an injunction against the
misappropriation of trade secrets to "reinforce the public policy of
commercial morality."
145
Injunctive relief-the shining example of the U.S. property rules
regime for addressing wrongs suffered by intellectual property owners-
exists on the recognition that wrongs cannot readily be righted by
monetary damages. In recent years, however, intellectual property owners
have faced a new hurdle in obtaining injunctive relief to right wrongs. The
Supreme Court, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., overturned the
Federal Circuit's long-standing rule on automatic injunctive relief upon a
finding of infringement. 46  Consequently, intellectual property owners
cannot obtain injunctive relief as a matter of course; they must instead
satisfy a four-factor test to show whether the injunctive relief is warranted.
Accordingly, irreparable harm is not presumed; therefore, injunctive relief
is no longer automatic. 47  In other words, injunctive relief is not readily
available in patent, copyright, and trademark infringement cases, 148 even if
the intellectual property owner has successfully established infringement
by the defendants.
B. Damages as Remedy
In general, damages are available to a prevailing plaintiff at trial if the
144 Section 2(a) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorizes an injunction "to eliminate
commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation." N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 350-B:2 (2010).
145 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Mass. 1994) (issuing injunction to prevent
the defendants' use of plaintiff's trade secrets, which the defendants misappropriated).
146 eBay Inc.v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006).
147 See generally Bushnell, Inc. v. Brunton Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1260 (D. Kan. 2009)
(holding that a presumption of irreparable harm may not be invoked post eBay); Tiber Labs., LLC v.
Hawthorn Pharm., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (same). But cf Powell v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 07-80435-CIV, 2009 WL 3855174, at *12-14 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009)
(applying presumption of irreparable harm); Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., Civ. Nos. 05-5727
(HAA)(ES), 07-5489(HAA)(ES), 2008 WL 1722098, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008) (finding
presumption of irreparable harm for preliminary injunctions in patent infringement actions post eBay).
148 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2010) ("We hold that, although the District
Court applied our Circuit's longstanding standard for preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, our
Circuit's standard is inconsistent with the 'test historically employed by courts of equity' and has,
therefore, been abrogated by eBay ...."); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d
1211, 1228 (11 th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e decline to express any further opinion with respect to the effect of
eBay on this case. For example, we decline to decide whether the district court was correct in its
holding that the nature of the trademark infringement gives rise to a presumption of irreparable injury.
In other words, we decline to address whether such a presumption is the equivalent of the categorical
rules rejected by the Court in eBay."); cf David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred:
Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1038 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's eBay decision "should not be used to eviscerate the normal presumption of irreparable harm
that attaches upon a showing of liability in trademark cases").
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plaintiff can prove direct injury caused by the infringement, and any lost
profits the plaintiff would have earned but for the infringement. 149  A
damages award, however, constitutes only compensation for the injured
plaintiff, not a penalty against the defendant. 50 Obtaining a damages
award at trial is generally a complex and costly task.'5' The burden is on
the owner to prove the damages caused by a defendant's infringing
conduct. 152  The owner must establish damages with reasonable certainty,
and have a reasonable basis for computing damages.53
In trademark infringement cases, the owners often do not pursue
damages at trial, even if they prevailed at the preliminary injunction or
summary judgment stage. For instance, in trademark infringement cases,
the trademark owners often realize early in the litigation that proving
damages is a very difficult task. 54 Though the defendant's use of the mark
causes a likelihood of consumer confusion between the defendant's
products and the plaintiffs products, the confusion does not necessarily
translate into a noticeable reduction in the sales volume of the plaintiffs
products even though the harm to the plaintiffs reputation is already
done. 55  The harm occurs because the plaintiff continues to advertise its
149 With respect to damages relief in a trademark infringement case, the federal trademark statute
provides that a trademark owner is entitled to recover defendant's profits, actual damages sustained by
the plaintiff, and costs of the action. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006). The statute dictates that the court, in
determining the appropriate monetary remedies, must be mindful of principles of equity. The court
may increase the actual damages, but not exceed three times the original amount. Id.
150 Whether or not an accounting of the infringer's profits is available as part of a damages award,
courts only allow the accounting if the infringement was "willfully calculated to exploit the advantage
of an established mark." Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp. 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993).
This language is occasionally, but mistakenly, attributed to Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing
Co., 692 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). Lindy Pen makes this mistake; however, Playboy does support this
proposition even if it is not stated in the precise words quoted above.
151 Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1909, 1913-15 (1997); see also Epstein, supra note 126, at 489 (stating the common view that damages
are speculative in complex intellectual property cases and contain a risk of the infringers under-
compensating the intellectual property holders).
152 See, e.g., Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[t]o
recover damages, [the plaintiff] must show that the [defendant's] violation caused actual confusion
among [plaintiff's] customers and, as a result, [the plaintiff] suffered actual injury") (citing Web
Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1990)).
153 Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
154 JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 917 (4th ed. 2007).
155 See Bemstein & Gilden, supra note 148, at 1059 ("[ln trademark cases ... proving damages
is 'notoriously difficult....') (citation omitted); K. J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement
and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 196 (1999) ("[C]onsumer confusion is difficult to redress by
money damages .... "); J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark
Infringement Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 4-5 (2009) ("Damage to
business reputation and good will is inherently 'irreparable' [and that means] trying to use dollars to
'compensate' after the fact for damage to business goodwill and reputation cannot constitute fair or full
compensation.") (citations omitted); Bryan M. Otake, The Continuing Viability of the Deterrence
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products, expending efforts on marketing and sales, while the defendant is
using a mark that is causing a likelihood of consumer confusion.
56
Consequently, with the poor prospect of obtaining damages at trial,
trademark owners prevailing at the preliminary injunction stage often settle
out of court. As observed by Thomas McCarthy, "getting a preliminary
injunction means that the trademark owner will immediately receive just
about all the relief it would be entitled to even after a win on the merits at
trial."' 57  Out-of-court settlements prevent wasted time, efforts, and
resources associated with going to trial.
The few trademark owners who decide to proceed to trial face an
additional, significant burden. Even if they succeed in obtaining a jury
verdict on liability, proving damages can be yet another difficult
challenge. 5 8 For example, in Lindy Pen v. Bic Pen,59 the plaintiff spent
thirteen years, from 1980 to 1993, in litigation to obtain damages. 60  In
that case, the plaintiff owned the trademark "Auditor's" for its ballpoint
pens used by accountants and auditors.' 6' The defendant adopted
"Auditor's Fine Point" for the sale and marketing of its ballpoint pens. 62
"[T]he district court determined that there was a likelihood of confusion in
the telephone order market [for the pens] .... , Though infringement
existed, the district court found that the plaintiff did not have sufficient
proof of actual damages in the form of lost profits.' 64  Also, the district
court found, with respect to actual damages, that the plaintiff "did not
isolate its own [Auditor's] telephone order sales from total pen sales" for
Auditors and, consequently, the plaintiff's calculations for damages
Rationale in Trademark Infringement Accountings, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 221, 229-30 (1998)
(indicating that it is "difficult for a trademark holder to procure sufficient evidence" to establish the
harm done to the plaintiffs business and recover monetary damages).
156 Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 148, at 1059 (asserting that "[t]he harm from trademark
infringement is thus usually irreparable because the trademark owner's loss of perpetual exclusivity and
control flows directly from the unauthorized, unlicensed use. An award of monetary damages alone
fails to address these fundamental trademark interests.").
157 McCarthy, supra note 155, at 1.
158 David S. Almeling, The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model: A Better Way to Award Monetary
Relief in Trademark Cases, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 211 (2007) ("As a practical matter, the tenuous,
market-based gains of trademark infringement are difficult to establish with the requisite degree of
certainty necessary for legal damages ... .
' 982 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1993).
160 See id. at 1403 (noting that the first dispute over trademark was back in 1965, and fifteen years
later, in 1980, the present case was brought against the same defendant).
161 Id.
162 Id (noting, as well, that Bic had conducted research on other parties' usage of the term
"Auditor's" in their marketing materials).
63 Id. at 1404.
164 Id. at 1407 ("Damages are typically measured by any direct injury which a plaintiff can prove,
as well as any lost profits which the plaintiff would have earned but for the infringement.") (citation
omitted). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to award damages related to lost profits
because the infringement was not willful. Id. at 1406.
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"contained items in which no likelihood of confusion existed . ,,165 The
plaintiff's separation of Auditor's pen sales from total pen sales was
deemed deficient. 166 After thirteen years of costly litigation, the plaintiff
did not obtain any damages for the defendant's trademark infringement.
167
In some cases, owners may rely on the loss of license fees due to the
unauthorized use of the intellectual property by the defendant. For
example, in MD. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,'68 the Tenth Circuit
upheld the jury verdict of damages against the defendants for
misappropriation of the plaintiff's trade secrets. 169 The plaintiff presented
evidence at trial of how the amount had been calculated, reflecting the
going rate of licensing for the trade secret in typical license arrangements
between the plaintiff and others, including the defendant. 170 As part of the
evidence for proving damages, the plaintiffs relied on experts to establish
the going rate and to illustrate hypothetical license arrangements.'
71
Recognizing the difficulty in proving actual damages, 172 copyright law
provides statutory damages to a copyright owner who prevails at trial.
173
An infringing defendant faces statutory damages of $30,000 per infringed
work for unintentional copyright infringement, and up to $150,000 per
infringed work for willful copyright infringement. 74  The plaintiff may
select statutory damages and thereby avoid the difficulty of proving actual
165 Id. at 1407-08.
... Id. at 1408-09.
167 Courts have long recognized that proof of actual damages is often difficult, but may permit
damages awards based on defendant's profits on the theory of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Bandag,
Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 918-21 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (vacating a district court's
award of damages in part because no actual damage could be shown). The court in Lindy Pen held that
the plaintiff failed to present evidence "of sales of the Bic's 'Auditor's Fine Point' in the infringing
[telephone order] market." Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1408. The court declined to accept Lindy's
assertion that "division of Bic's sales into the telephone submarket '[was] impossible from Bic's
records since Bic never separated its pens according to telephone sales."' ld.
16' 565 F.3d 753 (10th Cir. 2009).
1'Id. at 762-63, 766-67 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the defendant Kerr-McGee's motion for remittitur or new trial due to excessive
damages).
170Id. at 766-67 (ruling that the damages based on the going rate for licenses to use seismic data
"justily] the jury's $25,266,381 damage award").
171 Id. at 767. In this case, a geophysicist testified as the plaintiff's expert "in the area of custom
and practice in the licensing of seismic data" for the damages calculation. Id.
172 "Actual damages" is defined under the copyright statute to include loss to the copyright holder
plus additional profits made by the infringer. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
173 The prevailing copyright owner may elect either actual damages or statutory damages. Id. §
504(c)(1). Section 504(a) provides: "(a) In General.-Except as otherwise provided by this title, an
infringer of copyright is liable for either-(l) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional
profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by
subsection (c)."
174 Id. §§ 504(c)(l)-(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.").
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harm caused by the defendant's infringing conduct, though the plaintiff
may collect an insignificant amount.
75
The diminishing power of an injunction is evident. Injunctive relief is
no longer automatic for the prevailing intellectual property owner under
current law. Moreover, the difficulty of proving and obtaining damages
may serve as a catalyst to look beyond the borders of the United States to
learn what other nations are doing with respect to remedies, specifically
apologies as remedies in intellectual property law.
V. APOLOGIES AS REMEDIES IN CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. Apologies in Trademark Unfair Competition Cases
China's anti-competition statute prohibits conduct such as passing off a
registered trademark or use of a mark similar to a famous or well-known
trademark that misleads consumers. 7 6  When a defendant intentionally
infringes on a trademark or violates the anti-competition law in bad faith,
the court will then apply Article 56 of the Trademark Law to determine the
amount of compensatory damages,177 or statutory damages in cases where
damages are difficult to ascertain. 78 In addition to damages, a reasonable
cost award is available to the trademark owner under the anti-unfair
"'Id. § 504(c)(1) ("[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work ... a sum of not... more than
$30,000 .... ).
176 Anti-Unfair Competition Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2, 1993) (China). Article 5 of China's Anti-Competition Law includes
certain acts as unfair and damaging to competitors: "1. to feign the others' registered trade mark; 2. to
use the specific name, package, decoration of the famous or noted commodities, or use a similar name,
package, decoration of the famous or noted commodities, which may confuse consumers distinguishing
the commodities [from] the famous or noted commodities .... " Id. art. 5. See Hebei Sanhe Fucheng
Cattle Group Co. v. Kunming Branch of Harbin Fucheng Catering Co. (Higher People's Ct. of Yunnan
Province Apr. 5, 2007) (China).
177 Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2001,
effective Mar. 1, 1983) (amended 1993 and 2001) (China). Article 56 of China's Trademark Law
prescribes that:
The amount of compensation for infringement upon the right to the exclusive use
of a trademark shall be the proceeds obtained from the infringement during the
period of infringement, or the losses suffered by the infringement due to the
infringement during the period of being infringed, including the reasonable
expenses paid by the infringed to stop the infringing acts.
178 Trademark Law (China), art. 56 ("If it is difficult to determine the proceeds obtained from the
infringement referred to in the preceding paragraph, or it is difficult to determine the losses suffered by
the infringement due to the infringement, the people's court shall determine a compensation of 500,000
yuan or less according to the circumstances of the infringing acts.").
2012]
competition statute. 179 The court will also consider whether an apology
should be ordered.
Illustratively, Hebei Sanhe Fucheng Cattle Group Co. v. Kunming
Branch of Harbin Fucheng Catering Co., demonstrates the different types
of available remedies in China-particularly apologies. 180 In that case, the
plaintiff-owner of a registered, well-known brand, "Fucheng" (known for
hotpot restaurants)-brought a trademark infringement and unfair
competition action against the defendant. The defendant used marks
incorporating the characters for "Fucheng" in association with its own
hotpot restaurants.181 The plaintiff lost in the local people's court-the
court of the first instance-and appealed the judgment to the higher
court. 181
The Higher People's Court of Yunnan Province noted that the
plaintiff's trademark "Fucheng" is a well-known brand of hotpot
restaurants and has been in continuous use for many years throughout
China.1 83  The defendant had full knowledge of the reputation of the
plaintiffs trademark, as the defendant had long-term business contacts
with the plaintiff prior to opening its own hotpot restaurants. 84  The
defendant's use of the name and decoration were similar to the plaintiffs
trademark and decoration. Accordingly, the defendant "had the intent of
unfair competition against the principle of good faith," and "the subjective
intention to confuse the origin of service."' 185 In its judgment entered on
April 5, 2007, the court ordered the defendant to make a public apology in
the Kunming daily newspaper within ten days after the judgment "to
eliminate the bad effect of infringement," in addition to immediately
stopping use of the trademark at issue and paying a monetary sum of200,000 yuan for the plaintiffs economic losses. 186
When a defendant's infringing conduct is not deliberate or in bad faith,
the court will not order compensatory damages and public apology. For
example, in Tianjin Goubuli Group Co. v. Tianfengyuan Restaurant Of
179 Anti-Unfair Competition Law (China), art. 20 ("Manager shall bear the responsibility for
compensating the damage made by damager to the damaged party under the violation of this Law.
Amount of compensation shall be equivalent to the profit made by the damager during its damaging, if
it is difficult to measure the amount of damage; and it shall compensate the reasonable cost to the
damaged party who has paid the cost to investigate the activities of unfair competition made by
damager.").
180 Hebei Sanhe Fucheng Cattle Group Co. v. Kunming Branch of Harbin Fucheng Catering Co.
(Higher People's Ct. of Yunnan Province Apr. 5, 2007) (China).
181 Id.
182 Id. (the lower court, the Intermediate People's Court of Kunming City, rendered its decision on
November 24, 2006).
183 id.
1841id
185 Id.
186Id.
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 44:883
APOLOGIES AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REMEDIES
Jinan Daguanyuan Shopping Center, the defendant used the plaintiffs
registered service mark "Goubuli" for its dumpling products.1 87  The
plaintiff obtained registration for the "Goubuli" trademark in 1994, but the
defendant had previously used the same name in the 1940s. The court
found that, because the defendant had used the Chinese character for
"Goubuli" for its dumplings since 1940, the defendant did not intentionally
use the "Goubuli" characters for market competition even after the service
mark owned by the plaintiff was registered and determined as well-
known. 88  The court ordered the defendant to cease the use of the three
characters of "Goubuli" for its products and advertisements, 8 9 but neither
compensatory damages nor a public apology were available, as the
infringement was not in bad faith.190
B. Apologies in Copyright Infringement Cases
Article 46 of China's Copyright Law provides that anyone who
commits copyright infringement'9' must "bear the civil liability for such
remedies as ceasing the infringing act, eliminating the effects of the act,
187 Tianjin Goubuli Group Co. v. Tianfengyuan Rest. of Jinan Daguanyuan Shopping Ctr. (Higher
People's Ct. of Shangdong Province Oct. 10, 2007) (China).
188 Id.
189 Id
1901d, see also Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v. Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co. (Interm.
People's Ct. ofNanjing Municipality May 30, 2005) (China) (noting that the trademark owner failed to
provide evidence to prove that its "commercial credit has been injured," therefore, the plaintiffs
request for an apology was denied).
. 191 Copyright Law, art. 46 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27,
2001, effective June 1, 1991) (amended 2001) (China). Article 46 states that prohibited infringing tort
conduct includes:
(1) publishing a work without the permission from the copyright owner; (2)
publishing a work of joint authorship as a work created solely by oneself,
without the permission from the other co-authors; (3) having his name
mentioned in connection with a work created by another, in order to seek
personal fame and gain, where he has not taken part in the creation of the work;
(4) distorting a work created by another; (5) plagiarizing the works of others; (6)
exploiting a work by means of exhibition, making cinematographic productions
or a means similar to cinematographic productions, or by means of adaptation,
translation, annotation, etc. without the permission from the copyright owner,
unless otherwise provided in this Law; (7) exploiting a work of another without
paying the remuneration; (8) without the permission from the copyright owner or
oblige related to the copyright of a cinematographic work or a work created in a
way similar to cinematography, computer software, sound recordings or video
recordings, leasing his work or sound recordings or video recordings, except
where otherwise provided in this Law; (9) without permission from a publisher,
exploiting the format design of his published book or periodical; (10) without the
permission of the performer, broadcasting or publicly transmitting his live
performance or recording his performance; (11) committing other acts of
infringement upon copyright and upon other rights related to copyright.
2012]
,,1 92
making a public apology or compensating for damages .... In other
words, injunctive relief, apology, and damages are available to the
prevailing copyright owner. With respect to damages, Article 48 of the
Chinese Copyright Law authorizes compensatory damages to the
prevailing plaintiff for the plaintiff's actual loss, or awards damages to the
plaintiff in the amount of the defendant's illegal gains as well as the
plaintiff's reasonable costs. 193  If actual loss or illegal gains cannot be
ascertained, the maximum statutory damage award is 500,000 yuan.
194
An analysis of Founder Co., Red Mansion Institute v. Gaoshu Tianli
Co., Gaoshu Co. is instructive as to how Chinese courts have applied the
relevant articles of the Chinese Copyright Law. In Founder Co., the court
ordered an apology as a remedy, in addition to injunction, damages, and
costs.' 95  On September 3, 2001, the plaintiffs brought a copyright
infringement action against the defendants for reproducing and distributing
the Founder RIP and Founder Wenhe software without authorization, in
violation of China's Copyright Law.1 96 Upon reviewing the evidence of
the illegal distribution and sales of the plaintiffs' software by the
defendants all over China, on December 20, 2001, the Beijing No. 1
Intermediate Court ordered the defendants to stop the infringing acts-
namely reproducing and selling the plaintiffs' software-to make an
apology to the plaintiffs by publishing an announcement in Computer
World, to pay 600,000 yuan in economic losses to the plaintiffs, and to
reimburse the plaintiffs in the amount of 407,250 yuan for investigation,
evidence collection, and other costs. 197 The defendants appealed to the
Beijing Higher Court.198
The Beijing Higher Court reversed the lower court's decision with
respect to the damages. The Higher Court reasoned that the tactics
employed by the plaintiffs to obtain evidence of illegal reproduction and
distribution of the copyrighted software against the defendants violated the
principle of fairness, and that such conduct may potentially "destroy the
normal market order."'199 Specifically, the plaintiffs' employees used fake
names and contacted the defendants pretending to purchase pirated
Founder software. The Higher Court condemned the plaintiffs' method of
192 Id.
"' Id. art. 48.
1
9 4 id.
195 Founder Co., Red Mansion Inst. v. Gaoshu Tianli Co., Gaoshu Co. (No. 1 Interm. People's Ct.
of Beijing Municipality Dec. 20, 2001), rev'd, (Higher People's Ct. of Beijing Municipality July 15,
2002), rev'd, (Sup. People's Ct. Mar. 7, 2007) (China) (all three decisions are contained in the opinion
released by the Sup. People's Ct.).
196 id.
197 Id.
198Id. (appealed to the Higher People's Ct. of Beijing Municipality, which rendered its decision
on July 15, 2002).
199Id,
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collecting the evidence of infringement. Accordingly, the Higher Court
reduced the damages award to 130,000 yuan for plaintiffs' economic loss,
and awarded no compensation for investigation and evidence collection
costs. 200 The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Supreme People's
Court.20 1  The Supreme People's Court reversed the Higher Court's
decision, reinstating the damages awarded by the court of first instance.
The Supreme People's Court held that the method employed by the
plaintiffs to collect evidence of illegal reproduction and distribution of
their software was legal and effective, and "the facts proven with the
obtained evidence shall be used as the basis for determining the case."
2 02
That meant the plaintiffs' collection of evidence was neither in violation of
the fairness principle, nor did it destroy the normal market order. The
Supreme People's Court also affirmed the ruling on the injunction and
apology.20 3 The defendant was ordered to make a public apology to the
plaintiffs by "publishing an announcement on Computer World, with the
necessary expenses" to be borne by the defendants.2 4
Similarly, in Ding Xiaochun v. Nantong Education Bureau and
Jiangsu Fine Arts Publishing House, the plaintiff, a photographer, brought
a copyright infringement action against the defendants. 205 In that case, Mr.
Ding, a photographer with the Nantong Daily, took a picture of his wife
and child selecting and purchasing a lantern on the street. The photograph
was published in the Nantong Daily. A year later, the defendants
published books containing the plaintiffs photograph without permission,
and then republished the books again in 2002. The Intermediate People's
Court of Nantong found that the photograph was a work of original
expression protected under Chinese Copyright Law.206 On the issue of
authorship and ownership, the court held that Mr. Ding, the photojournalist
for the Nantong Daily, was the owner and author of the copyright of the
photograph.0 7 The court rejected the defendant Jiangsu Fine Arts
Publishing House's defense of the textbook exemption because the
20
0/d.
201 Id. (appealed to the Sup. People's Court, which rendered its decision March 7, 2006).
202 Id.
203 Id.; see also Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for
Foreign Mark Holders, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 371, 371-72 (2008) (noting that the Shanghai Second
Intermediate People's Court ordered the defendants in a trademark infringement action brought by Nike
to make a public apology for the infringing conduct, in addition to damages and an injunction ruling in
Nike's favor).
204 Founder Co., Red Mansion Inst. v. Gaoshu Tianli Co., Gaoshu Co. (No. I Interm. People's Ct.
of Beijing Municipality Dec. 20, 2001), rev'd, (Higher People's Ct. of Beijing Municipality July 15,
2002), rev "d, (Sup. People's Ct. Mar. 7, 2007) (China).
205 Ding Xiaochun v. Nantong Educ. Bureau and Jiangsu Fine Arts Publ'g House (Interm.
People's Ct. of Nantong City Dec. 19, 2002) (China).
206 id.207 ld.
20121
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defendant's art book was not an official teaching book that qualified for
copyright infringement exemption.208 The court held that the defendant's
conduct in publishing the photograph without the consent of the author,
failing to attribute authorship of the photograph, failing to pay the author
any remuneration, and altering the title of the photograph "constituted an
infringement" upon the copyright of the photograph.2 °9
The court ordered the defendant, Jiangsu Fine Arts Publishing House,
to cease the infringement, make a formal apology, and compensate the
plaintiff for his economic loss. Specifically, on December 19, 2002, the
court ordered the defendant to "publish an announcement to apologize to
Ding Xiaochun" within fifteen days of the judgment.2 10 Furthermore, the
court ruled that "the content of the announcement shall be examined and
approved by the Intermediate People's Court of Nantong City."21 The
court also stated that, in the event that the defendant, Jiangsu Fine Arts
Publishing House, failed to make the apology within the time limit, "Ding
Xiaochun may publish the announcement of apology in Nantong Daily in
the name of Jiangsu Fine Arts Publishing House, the content of the
announcement shall also be examined and approved by" the court, and the
64 11212
expenses shall be undertaken by Jiangsu Fine Arts Publishing House.
C. Apologies in Patent Infringement Cases
While apologies as remedies are available in trademark, unfair
competition, and copyright infringement cases, the same remedy is not
always afforded in patent infringement cases. In 2005 China's highest
court, the Supreme People's Court, addressed whether "the liability-
bearing method of making an apology applies" to patent infringement in
Renda Building Materials Factory v. Xinyi Co.213  Upon finding
infringement, the appellate court, the Liaoning Higher Court, ordered the
defendant Xinyi Company to make an apology to the patent holder. The
Supreme People's Court overturned the appellate court's finding of
infringement. With respect to apology as a remedy, the Supreme People's
Court held that "[m]aking an apology is mainly a way of bearing the
liability for damaging the aggrieved party's personal interests or
commercial credit standing. While patent right is mainly a kind of
property interest, hence this method generally does not apply to cases on
208 Id.
209 Id.
2101id.
211 Id.
212id.
213 Renda Bldg. Materials Factory v. Xinyi Co. (Interm. People's Ct. of Dalian City, Liaoning
Province Feb. 20, 2002), overruled by (Sup. People's Ct. Aug. 22, 2005) (China) (both decisions are
contained within the same opinion issued by the Sup. People's Ct.).
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dispute over patent infringement. ' 21 4  In other words, apology is not
available in patent infringement cases because a patent right is a property
right, and apology as a method of accepting liability is only available to the
personal interests of the aggrieved party. The Supreme People's Court did
not preclude an apology as a remedy in all patent infringement cases. The
Court noted that the appellate court had ordered the defendant to make an
apology before the court had all of the evidence proving that the
defendant's conduct caused heavy losses to the plaintiff's commercial
credit standing.215  The Supreme People's Court concluded that the
appellate court's order was therefore "inappropriate."
2 6
Apology was ordered, however, as a remedy in a case where the court
found the defendant guilty of patent infringement. In Institute of Organic
Chemistry of Chengdu Under the Chinese Academy of Sciences v. Chengdu
Zhengda Electric Apparatus Factory, the patentee brought a patent
infringement action against the defendant, Zhengda, for manufacturing and
selling air re-purifiers in violation of plaintiff's three patents: the "purifier
of duplication machine ozone," the "purifier of room air," and "a kind of
low-noise impeller of the centrifugal blower fan., 217 The Higher People's
Court of Sichuan Province affirmed the lower court's infringement finding
only with respect to "a kind of low-noise impeller of the centrifugal blower
fan" patent. The Higher People's Court, accordingly, reduced the damage
award from 150,000 yuan to 50,000 yuan. The Court accepted the
infringement finding, and the finding that the defendant knew the impellers
used in the metal blower fans in the Zhengda re-purifiers were the same as
those contained in the plaintiff's relevant patent.1 8 The defendant
nevertheless manufactured and sold the infringing product for several
years. The Court upheld the lower court's order with respect to making an
apology. Specifically, the defendant, Zhengda Factory, was instructed to
make public apologies to the plaintiff in three publications, China Patent,
Sichuan Daily, and Chengdu Evening Paper, for the purpose of "clearing
up ill effects. 219
2141id
215 Id.
216 id
217 Inst. of Organic Chemistry of Chengdu Under the Chinese Acad. of Scis. v. Chengdu Zhengda
Elec. Apparatus Factory (Interm. People's Ct. of Chengdu City June 29, 1999), aff'd ( Higher People's
Ct. of Sichuan Province Apr. 5, 2000) (China) (the two decisions are contained within the same opinion
issued by the Higher People's Ct. of Sichuan Province).218 1d
219 id.
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VI. APOLOGIES AS REMEDIES IN U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE
U.S. intellectual property owners rely on injunctions and damages as
common statutory remedies, as discussed in Part IV. Apologies as
remedies are not part of the relevant statutes for patents, copyrights,
trademarks, or trade secrets. The absence of apology as a statutory remedy
is consistent with the long-held suspicious view towards apologetic justice
in U.S. law. This absence, however, should not hinder a desire for internal
and external examination. Internally, any U.S. case law involving
apologies in intellectual property might be examined, and, externally-that
is, outside U.S. borders-Americans might endeavor to learn what others
have done or are doing so as to fulfill our own goals ofjustice.22 °
Looking domestically, there are several intellectual property cases
where the parties settled their disputes with apologies. For example, in
Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of America, Inc.,221
the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant for trademark
infringement and unfair competition based on the defendant's adoption and
usage of the "Scandinavia" trademark in connection with the sales of
belting.222 The Second Circuit addressed an important threshold question
of whether the plaintiff owned the "Scandinavia" trademark based on the
exclusive use of the trademark in commerce.223 The plaintiff offered
evidence of exclusive use, and the plaintiffs manager presented notable
testimony. Asked "whether he had ever heard of anyone who prior to the
defendant had undertaken to dispute his title to the mark 'Scandinavia,'
224
the manager recounted only one instance in which an unauthorized
company had used the plaintiffs trademark. Specifically, the manager
stated that in 1908, Osgood, Sayen Company had used the name
"Scandinavia" without permission, and when "the attention of the Osgood,
Sayen Company was called to their use of the trademark, they apologized,
said it was a mistake, and discontinued it."'225  The testimony of the
plaintiff's manager, among other evidence, supported the court's finding
that the plaintiff had the exclusive right to the trademark through exclusive
220 See Haley, supra note 2, at 504-07 (discussing the importance of looking beyond American
borders, in this case to Japan, to see how apology might play a role in achieving justice).
22' 257 F. 937 (2d Cir. 1919).
222 Id. at 961 (indicating that the lower court held that the defendant committed unfair competition
when it sold "in interstate commerce, and under the name 'Scandinavian' belting").
223 Id. at 957 ("The question then becomes important, whether this use of the word 'Scandinavia'
in the United States as a trade-mark for 10 years prior to the passage of the act was an exclusive use.").
224 Id. at 958.
225 Id. (emphasis added).
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use of the trademark.226
Scandinavia Belting demonstrates that in some cases, parties can settle
trademark infringement disputes out of court through an apology for the
unauthorized use of a trademark, and a subsequent cessation of the use of
the trademark. That is, the trademark owner sought and obtained justice
for the infringement in large part through an apology.
Likewise, in an older trademark cancellation proceeding, Model
Brassiere Co. v. Bromley-Shepard Co.,227 the parties had attempted to
settle their dispute with an apology.228 Specifically, the petitioner, prior to
seeking the cancellation of the registered trademark on the grounds of
descriptiveness, apologized to the trademark owner and promised not to
use the trademark.2 29 The petitioner, however, continued to use the
trademark because it was descriptive of the products and subsequently
sought cancellation of the trademark registration.230  The Court of Custom
and Patent Appeals affirmed a petition to cancel a registered trademark on
the ground of descriptiveness.23'
Additionally, in Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,232 an older case
involving the use of a recording artist's photograph by a bakery without
her permission, the artist sued the bakery for use of the newspaper
advertisement. 233  The artist also included the newspaper among the
defendants. The defendants immediately desisted from use of the
photograph, claiming that the use was a mistake, and apologized to the
plaintiff. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
226 Id. at 958 ("We must therefore hold that as the plaintiff is the 'owner' of the trade-mark... it
is entitled to protection thereunder as a valid trade-mark, without regard to whether it was or not valid
at the common law, and prior to its registration.").
227 49 F.2d 482 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
228 Id. at 484-86.
229 Id. at 485-86 (noting that trademark registrant asserted an affirmative defense "that petitioner
for cancellation upon registrant's request agreed to discontinue using the word Ensemble in violation of
registrant's trade mark rights evidenced by the certificate of registration herein sought to be canceled,
and that petitioner, when it subsequently made some further use of the word Ensemble in violation of
registrant's said rights apologized to registrant claiming that said use was inadvertent and would not be
repeated").
230 Id. at 486 ("[Tjhe record sufficiently shows that [petitioner] was a proper party in interest to
file a petition" to cancel the registered trademark on the ground of descriptiveness because "[a]s long as
the word 'Ensemble' is a registered trade-mark, it is a threat, not only against the party who
manufactures and sells merchandise like that of the parties to this suit, but to all who buy of them for
the purpose of resale"). Under current trademark law, descriptiveness is no longer a ground for
cancellation of trademark registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) ("A petition to cancel
registration of a mark ... [may] be filed ... at any time if the registered mark becomes the generic
name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or is functional, or has
been abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently .... ").
231 Model Brassiere Co., 49 F.2d at 487 (affirming the Commissioner's decision for cancellation
of the registered trademark).
232 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938).
233 Id. at 57.
20121
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
plaintiff would only be entitled to a judgment for nominal damages.234
The above cases, at the very least, demonstrate that American owners
of intellectual property rights-who are also parties to infringement
disputes involving trademarks and copyrights where reputation, goodwill,
and personal interests are of concern-have exhibited normative cultural
values favoring apology. The wrongdoers apologized for using a
trademark or photograph without permission, and the recipients accepted
their apologies. In addition, the courts involved were not hostile to
apologies. In fact, their decisions reflected the beneficial role of
apologies-as in Flake v. Greensboro News Co., where the court granted
only nominal damages, and in Model Brassiere Co. v. Bromley-Shepard
Co., where the court affirmed the petitioner's cancellation of the registered
trademark.
VII. CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years ago, John Haley wrote his influential article
Implications of Apology, which implored Americans to learn from Japan.
Since then, legal scholarship on apology has flourished and propelled new
legislation acknowledging the importance of apology and protecting
apologetic gestures. In this new century China has become a major force,
and, in the globally-connected economy, what happens in China matters in
the United States. In trademark and copyright infringement cases, Chinese
law recognizes the universal norm of apology and incorporates it as a form
of remedy-in addition to injunctive relief and damages. 235  Americans
should not summarily dismiss apology as a potential addition to the
remedies available in U.S. intellectual property disputes. Given the
weakening effect of injunctive relief, which is no longer granted as a
matter of course in patent cases, and its impact on copyright and trademark
infringement jurisprudence, it is imperative for the United States to learn
234 Id. at 64 ("Upon the present record, from it appears that said photograph was used by mistake
and without malice and that the defendants immediately desisted from the use thereof upon the
discovery of the mistake and made due apology therefor, the plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment
for nominal damages only.").
235 For a collection of other cases where Chinese courts ordered apologies, see Marisa Anne
Pagnattaro, "The Google Challenge".: Enforcement of Noncompete and Trade Secret Agreements for
Employees Working in China, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 603, 624-32 (2007) (detailing trade secrets
misappropriation cases and apologies ordered by Chinese courts). For detailed accounts of specific
cases, see Anne S.Y. Cheung, A Study of Cyber-Violence and Internet Service Providers' Liability:
Lessons from China, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 323, 330-31 (2009) (reporting that a Nanjing Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff in a defamation case against an internet site and ordered the defendant "to
delete all defamatory posting[s], issue a public apology on its website for ten days, and pay damages of
RMB 1000"); Hayden Opie, Survey: A Global Perspective on the Most Important Cases Affecting the
Sports Industry, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 114-15 (discussing the action brought by Olympic
gold medalist Liu Xian against several defendants for misappropriating his image and violating his
right of publicity and the court's order that the defendants make a formal apology and pay damages).
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from beyond its borders, envisioning just recourse for the person or entities
suffering reputational harm.

